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Abstract
Self-awareness represents the capacity of becoming the object of one’s own attention. In this state
one actively identifies, processes, and stores information about the self. This paper surveys the self-
awareness literature by emphasizing definition issues, measurement techniques, effects and func-
tions of self-attention, and antecedents of self-awareness. Key self-related concepts (e.g., minimal,
reflective consciousness) are distinguished from the central notion of self-awareness. Reviewed
measures include questionnaires, implicit tasks, and self-recognition. Main effects and functions of
self-attention consist in self-evaluation, escape from the self, amplification of one’s subjective
experience, increased self-knowledge, self-regulation, and inferences about others’ mental states
(Theory-of-Mind). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness is described in
which the role of face-to-face interactions, reflected appraisals, mirrors, media, inner speech, imag-
ery, autobiographical knowledge, and neurological structures is underlined.
Introduction
This article (Part 1 of two papers) explores the ‘how’, ‘why’, and ‘when’ of self-aware-
ness. In doing so it seeks to provide the reader with an overview of the most fundamen-
tal questions in this research area. How do our brain, cognitive processes, and social
environment give rise to self-awareness? Why are we self-aware – what functions does
self-reflection serve? And when, in what situations, are we most likely to engage in self-
observation? Another topic that will be examined is measurement issues. Note that Part 2
of this article will focus on where self-awareness is located in the brain and will address
the question of the importance of inner speech in self-referential processing.
Consciousness and Self-Awareness
It is imperative to start with clear definitions of key terms, as confusion between ‘con-
sciousness’, ‘self-awareness’, and a host of related expressions is rampant in the literature
(Antony, 2001, 2002). The sociologist George Herbert Mead (1934) proposed a classic dis-
tinction between focusing attention outward toward the environment (consciousness), and
inward toward the self (self-awareness). When ‘conscious’, an organism can successfully
process incoming information from the environment and respond to it adaptively
(Natsoulas, 1996). Under this definition, most, if not all nonhuman animals are conscious
(e.g., Edelman & Seth, 2009; Morin, forthcoming). Unconsciousness signifies the absence
of processing of information either from the environment or the self, such as during sleep
or coma. Various levels of consciousness have been identified (see Morin, 2006). Terms
such as ‘primary’, ‘peripheral’, ‘sensorimotor’, and ‘core’ consciousness designate more or
less sophisticated degrees of consciousness. For example, Zelazo (2004) uses the term
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‘minimal consciousness’ to describe the infant’s unreflective experience of stimuli in the
present, and Neisser (1997) labels ‘interpersonal self’ the raw awareness of one’ s engagement
in social interactions here and now, allowing one’s actions to mesh with those of others.
Self-awareness refers to the capacity of becoming the object of one’s own attention
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972). In this state one actively identifies, processes, and stores
information about the self. The important distinction here is as follows: One can perceive
and process stimuli from the environment (e.g., a color, food) without explicitly knowing
that one is doing so (consciousness). One becomes self-aware when one reflects on the
experience of perceiving and processing stimuli (e.g., I see a blue object; I am eating food
and it tastes good). Self-awareness represents a complex multidimensional phenomenon
that comprises various self-domains and corollaries. To illustrate, one can think about
one’s past (autobiography) and future (prospection). Similarly, one can focus on one’s
emotions, thoughts, personality traits, preferences, goals, attitudes, perceptions, sensations,
intentions, and so forth. The list of potentially relevant self-aspects is very long indeed
(see Ben-Artzi, Mikulincer, & Glaubman, 1995). Emotions or traits are private self-aspects
that can be distinguished from public self-dimensions – visible characteristics such as one’s
body, physical appearance, mannerisms, and behaviors (Fenigstein, 1987). Examples of
self-awareness corollaries are sense of agency, Theory-of-Mind (ToM; making inferences
about others’ mental states), self-description, self-evaluation, self-esteem, self-regulation,
self-efficacy, death awareness, self-conscious emotions, self-recognition, and self-talk
(Morin, Uttl, & Hamper, forthcoming). Some of these consequences of self-focused
attention will be examined below. Self-awareness also entails a sense of continuity as a
person across time and includes a feeling of self as being distinct from the rest of the
environment (Kircher & David, 2003). Self-awareness also comes in degrees: Terms such
as ‘meta’, ‘reflective’, ‘iterative meta-representational’, and ‘extended’ consciousness indi-
cate various levels of self-awareness (Morin, 2006; also see Legrain, Cleeremans, & Dest-
rebecqz, 2010). To illustrate, Newen and Vogeley (2003) distinguish between ‘conceptual
self-consciousness’, where the organism can conceptually represent itself, including its
mental states, and ‘meta-representational self-consciousness’, which consists in construct-
ing a mental model of oneself and of other people (ToM), and includes access to autobio-
graphical knowledge. Thus, whereas, conceptual self-consciousness uniquely pertains to
the self and its mental experiences, meta-representational self-consciousness also explicitly
includes self-memories and inferences about others’s experiences. The ultimate level of
consciousness is meta-self-awareness – being aware that one is self-aware (Morin &
Everett, 1990). Table 1 summarizes the analysis presented in this section.
Measures and Manipulations of Self-Awareness
Before 1972 most research conducted on self-awareness was phenomenological in nature
(Rime´ & LeBon, 1984). The publication of Duval and Wicklund’s book that year
Table 1 Four levels of consciousness
Levels Definition
1 – Unconsciousness Being nonresponsive to self & environment
2 – Consciousness Focusing attention on the environment; processing incoming external stimuli
3 – Self-awareness Focusing attention on the self; processing private & public self-information
4 – Meta-self-awareness Being aware that one is self-aware
808 Self-Awareness
ª 2011 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 5/10 (2011): 807–823, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00387.x
Social and Personality Psychology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
marked the beginning of the empirical study of self-focused attention. This team showed
that a state of self-awareness could be experimentally induced by exposing participants to
self-focusing stimuli. Stimuli such as mirrors, cameras, an audience, and recordings of
one’s voice are known to remind the person of his or her object status to others and reli-
ably produce heightened self-awareness (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Davis & Brock, 1975;
Geller & Shaver, 1976). Small mirrors generate an awareness of more private aspects of
the self, whereas large mirrors and audiences induce public self-scrutiny (Buss, 1980;
Davies, 2005).
Numerous self-report instruments have been developed to assess dispositional self-focus.
The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) was the first such questionnaire to be designed
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Psychometric evidence (e.g., test–retest reliability)
suggests that self-consciousness is stable enough to be viewed as a personality trait (Davis
& Franzoi, 1991). The SCS consists in three sub-scales: Private and public self-conscious-
ness, and social anxiety (Carver & Glass, 1976; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978).
Many different versions of the SCS have since been created (e.g., Burnkrant & Page,
1984; Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002) and translated in various languages (e.g., Bend-
ania & Abed, 1997). In 1990 Trapnell and Campbell reassessed the psychometric charac-
teristics of the SCS and showed that the private self-consciousness sub-scale actually
measures two different constructs: self-reflection and self-rumination (see Morin, 2002).
Self-reflection represents a genuine curiosity about the self, where the person is intrigued
and interested in learning more about his or her emotions, values, thought processes, atti-
tudes, etc. This type of introspection mostly leads to positive consequences associated
with good mental health, such as self-knowledge and self-regulation. Self-rumination is
anxious attention paid to the self, where the person is afraid to fail and keeps wondering
about his or her self-worth. It generally produces more negative consequences linked to
psychological dysfunctions such as anxiety and depression (Joireman, 2004; Joireman,
Parrott, & Hammersla, 2002). Excessive ruminative self-focus creates worry, guilt, shame,
jealousy, insomnia, etc. (Leary, 2004), and may contribute to social anxiety (Buss, 1980)
and depression (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Psychologically unhealthy individuals are known
to self-ruminate (Smith & Allow, 2009).
Spontaneously occurring fluctuations in self-awareness can be measured with the Situa-
tional Self-Awareness Scale (Govern & Marsch, 2001). Any social environment that
emphasizes a person’s unique characteristics (e.g., being the only female in a group of
males) leads to individuation and temporarily enhances self-focus (Phemister & Crewe,
2004). A social context that encourages similarity in behavior, appearance, and values
(e.g., the army) instead produces deindividuation and decreases self-focus (Diener, 1979;
Wicklund, 1975).
First-person singular pronouns use in written documents reflects increased self-aware-
ness because pronouns such as ‘me’, ‘myself’, and ‘mine’ indicate that the person is think-
ing about the self (Davis & Brock, 1975). Schaller (1997) showed that celebrities use
significantly more first-person singular pronouns in their songs or books following the
attainment of fame. Wegner and Giuliano (1980) developed the Linguistic Implications
Form, where participants are invited to complete ambiguous sentences by selecting the
pronouns that seem to fit best. The ratio of first- and third-person pronouns use is then
calculated as an index of self-awareness.
Health professionals often evaluate patients’ awareness of their deficits (e.g., after brain
injury) by quantifying the match between self- and other-ratings on cognitive, social, and
emotional functioning (Cocchini, Cameron, Beschin, & Fotopoulou, 2009); a low
match suggests self-awareness impairment. This measure can also be applied to assess
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self-knowledge in healthy individuals (Hoerold et al., 2008). Silvia and Eichstaedt (2004)
designed a Self-Novelty Manipulation where participants are asked to write about ways
in which they differ from others; thinking about what makes one unique induces self-
attention. The Word-Recognition Measure (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003) asks subjects to
identify self-relevant or self-irrelevant words as quickly as possible. Self-aware individuals
identify self-relevant words faster than nonself-aware individuals. One last measure of
self-awareness is facial self-recognition (see Gallup, 1968; Gallup, Anderson, & Shillito,
2002), which will be discussed in Part 2 of this review. Table 2 below summarizes the
above discussion pertaining to the assessment and manipulation of self-awareness.
It is noteworthy that with the exception of facial recognition, all existing measures of
self-awareness entail some form of verbal processing or production. The empirical study
of self-awareness in nonverbal organisms (e.g., infants and nonhuman animals) ends up
being severely impeded by this state of affairs. Nonlinguistic measures of metacognition
in animals have been used (e.g., uncertainty responses during perceptual or memory tasks
– see Smith, 2009), but because so many nonmentalistic accounts of animals’ performance
on these measures are available, it remains difficult to conclude that they indeed assess
metacognition per se – and thus self-awareness (Carruthers, 2008). Furthermore, employ-
ing an inner speech suppression condition to evaluate the role of language during self-ref-
erential processing would be highly problematic if a verbal measure of self-awareness were
to be used: Would the anticipated performance deterioration caused by the fact that
subvocal speech is required for the processing of self-relevant information, or because
participants in the suppression condition cannot process the linguistic information inher-
ent to the task?
Table 2 Main self-awareness measurement tools and manipulations
Measure Description
Self-focusing stimuli (mirrors, cameras, audience,
voice recording) (Duval & Wicklund, 1972)
Remind people of their object status & induce
self-observation
Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) Assesses individual differences in the time spend
focusing on private ⁄ public self-aspects & social
anxiety
Self-reflection ⁄ Self-rumination scales (Trapnell &
Campbell, 1999)
Quantify positive & negative forms of private
self-focus
Situational Self-Awareness Scale (Govern &
Marsch, 2001).
Measures spontaneously occurring fluctuations in
self-awareness
Linguistic Implications Form (Wegner & Giuliano,
1980)
First-person pronouns use indicates self-focus
because ‘me’, ‘myself’ & ‘mine’ equate
self-thinking
Match between self- and other-ratings on
cognitive, social, & emotional functioning
(Cocchini et al., 2009)
A match indicates intact self-knowledge – & thus
healthy self-reflection
Self-Novelty Manipulation (Silvia & Eichstaedt,
2004). Participants are asked to write about
ways in which they differ from others
Thinking about what makes one unique induces
self-attention
Word-Recognition Measure (Eichstaedt & Silvia,
2003). Subjects are asked to identify self-relevant
or self-irrelevant words as quickly as possible
Increased self-focus facilitates recognition of
self-relevant words
Self-recognition (Gallup, 1968) Recognizing one’s face in a mirror or on a
photograph indicates self-awareness
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Effects and Functions of Self-Attention
Self-evaluation
Research conducted these last 40 years with the aforementioned manipulations and
measures suggests that heightened self-focus produces a host of effects (for reviews see
Carver, 2002; Silvia & Duval, 2001; Wicklund, 1975, 1978). Inducing self-awareness
with self-focusing stimuli leads to self-evaluation (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), whereby
the person compares any given salient self-aspect to an ideal representation of it. Self-
criticism is then likely to occur, leading to an avoidance of the state of self-awareness
or a reduction of the real self – ideal self-discrepancy, by either modifying the target
self-aspect or by changing the ideal itself. Figure 1 schematically illustrates the self-eval-
uation process. Note that positive discrepancies can exist (e.g., following a success expe-
rience), in which case a person will actually seek the state of self-awareness.
Representative research shows that participants with salient self-related discrepancies
(e.g., an induced attitude-behavior inconsistency) will be reluctant to sit in front of a
mirror, whereas subjects with consistent attitudes will not (Greenberg & Musham,
1981). Children will less frequently transgress a standard (e.g., the experimenter’s
instructions to take only one candy on Halloween) and college students will cheat less
often on a bogus IQ test when in front of a mirror (Beaman, Klentz, Diener, &
Svanum, 1979).
More recent work conducted by Silvia and Duval (2001) further qualifies the self-eval-
uation process outlined above. Figure 2 depicts the revised process. The larger the
Figure 1 The self-evaluation process (Morin, 2003b).
Figure 2 The revised self-evaluation process (Morin, 2003b).
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discrepancy the stronger the need to avoid self-awareness as opposed to reducing the dis-
crepancy, and vice-versa. Positive outcome expectancy and high rate of progress increase
the likelihood of changing the self as opposed to escaping it, and vice-versa for negative
outcome expectancy and low rate of progress. Self-aware individuals who focus on the
real self will attribute the cause of the discrepancy to the real self and will try to change
it. Paying attention to the standard instead motivates people to attribute the cause of the
discrepancy to the standard, and that standard (as opposed to the real self) will be
modified.
Escaping the self
Self-awareness avoidance may take many forms. One of the most frequent form of escape
from the self is watching television. Moskalenko and Heine (2003) measured the amount
of time participants watched television after receiving the result of a sham IQ test. To
create a self-discrepancy to motivate participants to avoid self-awareness, the team told
some participants that they did very poorly on the IQ test. Other participants receive a
positive feedback or no feedback at all. During a 6-minute period in which television
was available after test scores were disclosed, subjects who got back good scores (no dis-
crepancy) were observed watching TV only 2.5 minutes on average. Those who received
no feedback on their score watched TV for about 3 minutes, and participants who were
told that they had low IQ scores (discrepancy) turned to TV an average of more than
4 minutes.
People also escape the self by drinking alcohol, taking drugs, overeating, engaging in
extreme sexual behavior, and ultimately committing suicide (Baumeister, 1990, 1991;
Hull, 1981). Indeed, people who experience real self – ideal self-discrepancies (e.g., fail-
ing to attain important standards) report an increased accessibility to suicide-related
thoughts (Chatard & Selimbegovic´, 2011). Schaller (1997) proposed that famous people
experience chronic self-focus and may resort to extreme strategies in order to reduce neg-
ative emotions caused by chronic self-observation, namely, drug and alcohol abuse, or
even suicide. Schaller (1997) conducted three single-case (historiometric) quantitative
analyses in which he produced biographical outlines of famous persons known for their
self-destructive behaviors: Songwriters Kurt Cobain (who committed suicide in 1993)
and Cole Porter (1891–1964 – Porter was an alcoholic), and writer John Cheever (1912–
1982 – also an alcoholic). Schaller measured self-awareness by calculating the number of
first-person singular pronouns found in the songs, short stories or personal letters of these
three celebrities. Using biographies, he then determined the exact moment these individ-
uals attained fame and also measured Cheever’s self-reported alcohol consumption by ana-
lyzing his personal letters. As predicted, the onset of fame induced high self-focus. In
other words, Cobain, Porter, and Cheever began to use significantly more first-person
singular pronouns in songs, stories, and personal letters following their brush with fame.
Also, this onset was significantly related (in Cheever’s case) to higher self-reported alcohol
use.
Morin and Craig (2000) expanded these results with one additional case-study: Nobel
prize winner Ernest Hemingway – a well-known heavy drinker who committed suicide
in 1961 (see Burgess, 1978). The team analyzed Hemingway’s writings and personal let-
ters, and showed that there was a significant increase in self-awareness following fame in
1929 when A Farewell to Arms was published. Morin and Craig (2000) also assessed self-
awareness (with the SCS) and self-reported alcohol use in relatively well-known and not
well-known students and faculty members in a Canadian university. Self-focus and
812 Self-Awareness
ª 2011 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 5/10 (2011): 807–823, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00387.x
Social and Personality Psychology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
alcohol use were significantly higher in the group of well-known participants (e.g.,
Deans, Chairs, and Heads of programs).
Increased emotional intensity
Another effect of self-awareness is emotional intensity: Focusing on one’s emotions or
physiological responses amplifies one’s subjective experience (Carver & Scheier, 1981).
To illustrate, angry self-aware individuals will behave more aggressively than nonself-
aware participants when provoked by the experimenter (Scheier, 1976). Self-focused
males will rate pictures of naked females significantly more positively than nonself-aware
males (Scheier & Carver, 1977). Silvia (2002), however, suggests that the amplification
effect exclusively applies to emotions resulting from self-discrepancies – a more intense
joy following a success experience and a more painful disappointment caused by failure.
In addition, negative emotions resulting from social rejection are avoided through self-
awareness escape, which leads to emotional lethargy instead of amplification (Twenge,
Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003).
Self-knowledge
Self-awareness also increases accurate access to one’s self-concept (Gibbons, 1983; Mark-
us, 1983). Self-reports of self-aware individuals are more accurate (Pryor, Gibbons,
Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977; Turner, 1978). Subjects being chronically attentive to
public self-aspects will give a faster evaluation of their physical characteristics when com-
pared with low publicly self-conscious subjects, and will be judged by others as being
more attractive, presumably because they are more concerned and careful about the way
they present themselves (Turner, Gilliland, & Klein, 1981). Self-focused subjects who will
be given a placebo with the anticipation of symptoms of arousal will report experiencing
significantly less symptoms than controls (Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, & Hormuth, 1979).
In short, it seems that self-aware individuals know themselves better (Turner, unpublished
data) – although this conclusion has been questioned on conceptual grounds by Silvia and
Gendolla (2001). To illustrate, it remains possible that better self-report accuracy follow-
ing self-focus be the result of an heightened consistency motivation or the activation of
honesty standards as opposed to plain better introspection. Other effects or consequences
of self-awareness are increased consistency between one’s behavior and attitudes (Gib-
bons, 1978), reduction of the self-serving bias (e.g., tendency to attribute failure inter-
nally) provided that a probability for improvement exists (Duval & Silvia, 2002),
increased self-disclosure in intimate relationships (Davis & Franzoi, 1986), stronger reac-
tion to social rejection (Fenigstein, 1979), and a decrease in social conformity and in anti-
normative behavior (Diener & Wallbau, 1976).
Self-regulation
Overall, our ability to self-reflect facilitates a smooth navigation in our social environment
and thus increases the likelihood of survival (Leary, 2004). More specifically, one major
adaptive function of self-awareness is self-regulation, which includes altering one’s behav-
ior, resisting temptation, changing one’s mood, selecting a response from various options,
and filtering irrelevant information (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003). Self-regulation involves a
self-evaluative process described above, itself dependent upon self-awareness. In essence,
one must be cognizant of what self-aspects need to be modified before effective
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cognitive-behavioral control can occur (Mikulas, 1986). Carver and Scheier (1981, 1982;
Carver, 1979; Scheier & Carver, 1988) proposed a comprehensive model of self-regula-
tion based on self-attention. Current work in this area indicates that self-regulation con-
sumes an energy that is depleted afterward. When people dominate their responses, they
are later less successful at controlling themselves. Some resource similar to strength is
exhausted during self-regulation, which creates a state called ‘ego depletion’ (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). Positive affect helps
improve self-regulation following ego depletion (Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Murave,
2007). Private speech use in children has been shown to be positively correlated with
effective self-regulation (e.g., Meichenbaum, 1976; Vygotsky, 1943 ⁄1962; Winsler,
2009). There is recent evidence that the link between self-talk and self-regulation also
applies to adults and is causal – not just correlational. Tullett and Inzlicht (2010) blocked
participants’ inner speech by asking them to mentally repeat the word ‘computer’ and
observed greater impulsivity (i.e., more errors) on a task requiring to press (or not to
press) on a button following the presentation of preselected stimuli.
Theory-of-mind
Self-awareness is also related to our ability to engage in ToM, which constitutes a funda-
mental component of social cognition (Malle, 2005). ToM represents the ability to attri-
bute mental states such as goals, intentions, beliefs, desires, thoughts, and feelings to
others (Gallagher & Frith, 2003). The benefits of ToM are the possibility of predicting
others’ behavior and, on that basis, helping, avoiding, or deceiving others as the situation
dictates. A full development of ToM occurs at around 6 years of age; this development
seems to be related to language acquisition (Garfield, Peterson, & Perry, 2001; Milligan,
Astington, & Dack, 2007) and triadic interactions (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). ToM
deficits have been observed in autism (Baron-Cohen, 2001) and schizophrenia (Brune,
2005). These deficits are increasingly being associated with brain dysfunction, most prob-
ably located in the more anterior region of the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (Amodio
& Frith, 2006). The links between ToM and self-awareness are complex and still poorly
understood (Williams, 2010; for a review see Dimaggio, Lysaker, Carcione, Nicolo, &
Semerari, 2008). Common brain areas are recruited when we both introspect and think
about others’ mental states (Rameson & Lieberman, 2009). Some argue that ToM devel-
opment (thinking about others’ mental states) precedes self-awareness growth (thinking
about one’s own mental states; Carruthers, 2009). In this perspective, self-reflection
would constitute a by-product of ToM. However, the most popular hypothesis (the
Simulation ⁄Projection view) suggests that self-awareness comes first and is then followed
by a natural tendency to impute internal states to others through a form of mental simu-
lation or projection (e.g., Gallup, 1982; Keenan, Gallup, & Falk, 2003). Studies show
that better self-reflection abilities are associated with better ToM skills (Lysaker, Dimag-
gio, Buck, Carcione, & Nicolo, 2007). In addition, improving self-awareness skills in
clinical populations (e.g., schizophrenia) may lead to more sophisticated ToM abilities
(Lysaker & Hermans, 2007). A variation of the Simulation view states that once fully
developed, TOM stops directly involving self-awareness and takes a life of its own
(Morin, 2003a). That is, one most likely first needs to be aware of one’s own mental
states in order to conceive that other persons may be experiencing comparable processes.
Once one knows that other persons probably experience mental events like one does,
there is no need anymore to constantly self-reflect in order to better understand these
mental experiences.
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A Neurocognitive and Socioecological Model of Self-Awareness
Above and beyond definitions, measures, effects, and functions, one must ask: What are
the underlying mechanisms that explain the emergence and maintenance of self-aware-
ness? How can one organize most known information about self-awareness into a coher-
ent global system? Various models of self-reflection have been proposed (e.g., Burns &
Engdahl, 1998a,b; Feinberg, 2011b; Mischel & Morf, 2002; Rochat, 2010; Stuss, Picton,
& Alexander, 2001). However, these models tend to exclusively address isolated neuro-
logical or social factors involved in self-awareness. Morin (2004) put forward a more
comprehensive neurocognitive and socioecological model which considers brain regions,
environmental and social influences, and cognitive processes that lead to self-awareness.
Figure 3 shows three main sources of self-awareness: The social milieu (1), the physical
world (2), and the self (3). Italic numbers and capital letters in the text below refer to ele-
ments of the model in Figure 3. Solid lines join the first two sources of self-awareness to
the self, as well as the self to itself. The social environment contains early face-to-face
communication (1.1), self-relevant feedback that the individual gets from other persons
(reflected appraisals [1.2]), a social comparison mechanism that initiates perspective taking
(1.3), and the presence of other individuals observing the self (audiences [1.4]). The
physical environment consists in objects and structures that produce bodily awareness and
self–world differentiation in infants (2.1), self-focusing and reflecting stimuli (2.2), and
written material printed in books, articles, and numerous media sources (2.3). The self
can further develop bodily awareness with proprioception (3.2) and can reflect on itself
by engaging in cognitive processes such as inner speech (3.3) and imagery (3.4). Self-
awareness also requires the activation of specific brain structures (3.1) as well as autobio-
graphical information (3.5). Broken lines in Figure 3 correspond to various links (e.g., A,
B, C...) that can be drawn between all these sources of self-information. Table 3 summa-
rizes the links proposed by the model. Note that the neuroanatomy of self-awareness
(3.1) and the role played by inner speech (3.3) will be examined in Part 2 of this review.
Figure 3 A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness (Morin, 2004).
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Social world (1)
The role of early nonverbal social communication (1.1) between the infant and the care-
giver in self–other differentiation has been extensively studied (e.g., Butterworth, 1992,
1995; Legerstee, 1999; Neisser, 1997; Rochat, 2003). Infants and caregivers repeatedly
engage in face-to-face interactions during which both participants react to one another
by smiling and vocalizing. The infant’s behavior motivates responses from the caregiver,
with the baby responding in turn, and so forth. This leads to an understanding that the
self can produce effects in the environment and that it represents a unique and indepen-
dent entity. Imitation is important in that respect. The infant imitates tongue protrusion,
mouth opening, lip pursing, sequential finger movements, blinking, vocalization, gestures,
and emotional expressions. Perceiving the match between self and other informs the self
about itself (Butterworth, 1995). The development of bodily awareness is also facilitated
by frequent physical contact between infant and caregiver.
Cooley (1902) proposed that people often comment on one’s personality characteristics
and behaviors. These reflected appraisals (1.2) are informative to the self and can also
induce self-focus. Mead (1934; also see Natsoulas, 1985) suggested that comparisons with
others motivate individuals to take others’ perspectives to gain an objective point of view
on themselves (1.3). Once in this stance, individuals become self-aware and can acquire
information about the self.
As discussed earlier, being in front of an audience (1.4) creates self-focus (Diener,
1979; Diener, Lush, DeFour, & Flax, 1980). For instance, participants scored significantly
higher on a measure of egocentrism when in front of an audience than when alone (Car-
ver & Scheier, 1978). Being observed by only one person is enough to produce self-
awareness (Buss, 1980). Representative examples include giving a speech in front of a
class, being the target of attention as one enters a room full of people, or being observed
by one’s boss at work.
Physical world (2)
Bermudez (1998, 1999) argues that visual perception and physical interactions with
objects foster self-world differentiation (2.1; also see Butterworth, 1992, 1995; Legerstee,
1999; Neisser, 1997). Visual kinesthesis simultaneously involves self-perception and world
perception. The self appears in vision as the boundary of the visual field; likewise, the
patterns of flow in the optic display and the relationships between the changing and stable
qualities of the physical environment allow the perceiver to learn about his or her own
movements. In addition, lateral displacement, rotation, and movement against a back-
ground, as well as contacts with objects and people (e.g., touching, squeezing, rubbing,
Table 3 Various links proposed by the model
A: Physical stimuli (2.2) extend perspective taking (1.2)
B: Self-reflecting devices (2.1) participate in the formation of body awareness (3.2)
C: Imagery (3.4) can internally reproduce social mechanisms (1.2, 1.3) responsible for self-awareness
D: Experiences with self-reflecting devices (2.1) are crucial in acquiring autoscopic imagery (3.4)
E: Inner speech (3.3) can reproduce social feedback (1.1)
F: Inner speech (3.3) can internalize others’ perspective (1.2)
G: Self-talk (3.3) is activated when one is exposed to self-reflecting devices (2.1)
H: Inner speech (3.3) is activated when brain areas known to sustain self-awareness (3.1) get activated
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sucking, throwing, kicking), make it possible for the infant to further develop a kines-
thetic sense of self.
As seen previously, the physical environment contains self-focusing stimuli that induce
self-attention (2.2). These stimuli can also be seen as self-reflecting objects. One can
acquire key information about one’s facial features and expressions, mannerisms, tone of
voice, body height and weight, skin tone and complexion, hairstyle, etc. by observing
oneself in the mirror or seeing oneself on video. These public characteristics are impor-
tant because they at least partially define one’s personal identity (Cole, 1999). Another
type of physical stimuli that can produce self-focus is written material found in books and
articles, the media (newspapers and television news and programs), the Internet, radio,
CDs, and movies, including videotapes and DVDs (2.3; see Link A in Figure 3). These
stimuli convey a host of views and behaviors (and, indirectly, underlying motives, values,
attitudes, emotions, etc.) that are potentially different from one’s own present beliefs and
actions. Being exposed to different ideas or emotions (e.g., a journalist’s appraisal of a
given event) is likely to elicit perspective taking and self-awareness (e.g., how do I assess
this event?).
The self (3)
The self can become the object of its own attention and reflect on itself (Duval & Wickl-
und, 1972). It thus becomes a precious source of self-information to which it has privi-
leged access. The baby’s body constantly experiences various states of pressure and
temperature, friction from skin receptors, balance and posture from joints, muscles, and
the vestibular system (Eilan, Marcel, & Bermudez, 1995). These experiences all facilitate
the development of somatic proprioception (3.2). Double sensory stimulation also pro-
vides information about the body: When infants touch themselves, they simultaneously
feel that they touch and are being touched. Link B in Figure 3 suggests that self-reflecting
devices present in one’s environment (2.2) also play a role in the formation of body
awareness. Repeatedly perceiving oneself in the mirror, on video camera, or in pictures
offers additional information about one’s body that could be combined with somatic
information previously acquired through proprioception.
Cognitive processes such as inner speech (3.3) and imagery (3.4) are likely to partic-
ipate in self-awareness. Imagery represents the phenomenon of visual experiences in the
absence of any visual stimulus from the outside world (Morris & Hampson, 1983). The
fact that one can have autoscopic imagery (i.e., images of the self) suggests that this pro-
cess is implicated in self-awareness. Empirical evidence is limited: Turner et al. (1978)
noted that highly self-conscious people report using imagery as a means of introspec-
tion. The idea here is that one can mentally create (or replay) scenes in which the self
is an actor (e.g., been pulled over by the police for speeding). Self-aspects (e.g., ner-
vousness) can be deduce from what the actor is mentally seen doing. A more precise
suggestion is that imagery can internally reproduce and expand social mechanisms
responsible for self-awareness (Morin, 1998; see Link C in Figure 3). Mead (1934)
already proposed that one social mechanism leading to self-awareness is the opportunity
to see oneself as one is seen by others (1.3). Mental images empower one to literally
see oneself acting (or having behaved) in given ways as others would see (or have
seen) one acting.
The model also postulates that a specific neural network (3.1) which has been shown
to be involved in self-referential thinking be activated. This network includes cortical
medial structures (e.g., ventromedial and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex), lateral prefrontal
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cortex, precuneus, insula, posterior and anterior cingulate cortex, and bilateral temporo-
parietal junction (Northoff, Qin, & Feinberg, 2011; Salmon et al., 2008; Van der Meer,
Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2009). Furthermore, it suggests that access to autobio-
graphical material (3.5) is fundamental to selfhood. A large part of one’s personal identity
stems from the recollection one has of one’s past personal events (Klein, Rozendal, &
Cosmides, 2002; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011). Indeed, the severity of self-awareness
impairment in Alzheimer’s patients correlates with the severity of autobiography memory
deficits (Fargeau et al., 2010).What one did in the past and the events one experienced
define the self in the present and actually also plays a role in how one imagines the self in
the future. Thinking about the future constitutes an important mental activity as people
report experiencing future-oriented thoughts every 16 minutes (D’Argembeau, Renaud,
& Van der Linden, 2011). Current work suggest that autobiographical knowledge serves
as raw material for imagining possible future events (Quoidback, Hansenne, & Mottet,
2008; Szpunar, 2010; also see Smallwood et al., forthcoming). In short, one’s past shapes
how one sees oneself in the future.
Note that according to the model the various components of the self examined
above represent different levels of analysis (i.e., cognitive versus neural), with different
types of cognitive processes (e.g., autobiography) involved in self-awareness. Further-
more, despite the fact that imagery, inner speech and autobiographical information were
discussed separately, it must be emphasized that these processes actively interact in com-
plex ways. Imagery and inner speech are seen here as cognitive processes that contribute
to the representation of autobiographical information.
Conclusion
This article raised the following questions: How do we become self-aware, why are we
self-aware to start with, and when are we most likely to engage in self-observation? To
summarize, we develop and maintain self-focus (the how question) through social inter-
actions from infancy (e.g., nonverbal face-to-face communication) to adulthood (e.g.,
reflected appraisals) and forward, exposure to physical stimuli (e.g., mirrors, the media –
which may initiate perspective taking), activation of medial prefrontal cortex and
peripheral brain structures, recall of past personal events, and use of cognitive processes
(e.g., imagery) that allow the self to communicate with itself. Self-awareness is beneficial
(the why question) mostly because it makes self-regulation and inference about others’
mental states possible. And we especially tend to focus attention on the self (the when
question) when exposed to self-focusing stimuli, when differences between the self and
others are made salient, and when we engage in inner speech or imagery about the
self.
The model discussed in the last part of this paper may be more encompassing than pre-
vious attempts at synthesizing known information pertaining to self-awareness, but it is
still incomplete. Other influences on the self, most notably culture (Markus & Kitayama,
2010) and developmental mechanisms (Lewis, 2011), to name only two, also need to be
integrated into the big picture. Additional questions which have not been addressed here
are animal minds (Stevens, 2010) and self-awareness (Edelman & Seth, 2009), and the
psychopathology of self-awareness (Feinberg, 2011a). Part 2 of this review will not do
justice to all existing aspects of self-awareness research but will aim at providing the
reader with a broader outlook by adding a discussion on the neuroanatomy of self-aware-
ness and the importance of inner speech for self-referential activity.
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